Non-naturalism is the view that normative properties are response-independent, irreducible to the natural, and causally inefficacious. It has been widely discussed that non-naturalism faces a serious epistemological challenge. A less discussed problem for non-naturalism concerns the metasemantic connection between our normative beliefs and the normative facts. Ideally, the non-naturalist could remain ecumenical between metasemantic views. As others have noted, this is not possible. The challenge is for the non-naturalist to find an independently motivated metasemantic view that comports with non-naturalism. This is the metasemantic challenge. This paper focuses on the second of these challenges, but it has interesting implications for the first. I argue that non-naturalists should endorse an epistemic account of content-fixing. A crucial implication of this account is that, if correct, a complete moral epistemology will simultaneously rebut metasemantic objections. Thus, the two challenges in effect amount to one. This, of course, doesn’t demonstrate that the epistemic challenge can be met. But it entails a tight relationship between the epistemological and metasemantic challenges.